Economic slowdown and financial fragility : the structural malaise of India’s growth process by Dasgupta, Zico
 MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCE
MARCH 28, 2020 vol lV no 13  EPW  Economic & Political Weekly46
Discussions with Arjun Jayadev, Rohit Azad and Partha Ray greatly 
helped in writing this article.
Zico Dasgupta (zico.dasgupta@apu.edu.in) works at Azim Premji 
University, Bengaluru. 
Economic Slowdown and Financial Fragility 
The Structural Malaise of India’s Growth Process
Zico Dasgupta 
The Indian economy is presently gripped by the dual 
phenomenon of an unprecedented slowdown as well 
as financial fragility. What has triggered this? Is this 
simply a random exogenous shock to an otherwise 
well-functioning economy? Or, is there anything 
structural about the present slowdown? What are the 
binding constraints for recovery? These questions are 
addressed in the context of India’s overall growth 
trajectory and policy regime in the last two decades.
This is certainly not the fi rst time that the Indian econo-my has witnessed economic slowdown in the recent past. Ever since the implementation of economic liber-
alisation, the economy has gone through several slowdowns, 
followed by many recoveries. And, yet, this time it is different. 
There are at least two distinguishing features of the present 
episode of slowdown which suggests so.
The fi rst feature refers to the longevity of the present slow-
down. Both in terms of annual and quarterly gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rates, the present slowdown has been 
more prolonged than any other previous episodes of slowdown 
during the liberalisation period. As evident from Table 1, 
which describes this phenomenon, the longevity of the present 
slowdown has already surpassed not only that of the 1990s or 
early 2000s, but even that of the immediate post-crisis period 
of 2008–09 and the one witnessed during 2011–12 and 2012–13.1 
While the previous episode of slowdown between 2011–12 and 
2012–13 comes close to the present one in terms of its longevity, 
the latter is qualitatively distinct for its second feature.
The second feature involves worsening of the balance sheet of 
the non-fi nancial private corporate sector, the intensity of which 
is presently much greater than the previous episode of slowdown. 
If the fi nancially stressed fi rms are defi ned as those whose profi t 
income (profi t before depreciation, interest, tax and amortisation) 
is less than the interest payments (interest coverage ratio is less 
than 1), then the share of such stressed fi rms in the corporate sector 
fi rms has increased sharply in the recent period (Figure 1, p ??). 
In short, the present episode of slowdown is not only un-
precedented in the recent period in terms of its longevity, but 
in contrast to the previous episodes of slowdown, it has set in 
when the economy was already gripped by fi nancial fragility. 
It is this prolonged period of slowdown, along with high fi nancial 
fragility that remains to be the defi ning feature of the present 
Table 1: Episodes of Slowdown, 1994–95 to 2019–20
Episodes of Slowdown Number of years Total Number of  Number of Quarters
 Of Slowdown Quarters of Slowdown When Growth Slowed  
   Down for Consecutive  
   Periods
1997–98 1 3 2
2000–01 1 2 1
2002–03 1 2 0
2008–09 1 4 4
2011–12 to 2012–13 2 6 5
2017–18 to 2019–20* 3 7 6
Slowdown in period “t” is defined as a phenomenon where GDP growth rate at period “t” is 
less than that of period “t-1.”  *Figures till second quarter of 2019-20 
Source: Calculated from Linked GDP Series, National Statistical Commission; GDP Quarterly 
Estimates, CSO.
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slowdown. What triggered them? Is this simply a random 
exogenous shock to an otherwise well-functioning economy? 
Or is there anything structural about the present slowdown? 
What are the binding constraints for recovery? This article 
aims to address these questions in the context of India’s overall 
growth trajectory and policy regime since the 2000s. 
External Dependence and Financial Fragility
The defi ning feature of any capitalist economy is the analytical 
separation of ex ante investment decisions from the savings 
decisions, as investment decisions are formed on the basis of 
expectations around future profi t in the midst of “fundamental 
uncertainty” (Keynes 2006; Dow 2015). While investment deci-
sions and profi t expectations are formed on the basis of expected 
demand conditions, the latter, in turn, can be argued to be affected 
by, inter alia, the present demand conditions and, hence, the 
autonomous components of aggregate demand. The steady 
state growth rate and profi t rate of a typical capitalist economy 
accordingly is determined by expectations and autonomous 
components of demand (Dutt 1990; Hein 2014). These stylised 
facts open up the possibility of at least two forms of instability 
in the growth process of a capitalist economy as follows.
First, in the midst of inherited payment commitments, 
there exists no a priori reason in a capitalist economy why the 
exogenous components of demand would be necessarily such 
so that the solvency condition of fi rms is met. If the solvency 
condition of a fi rm is defi ned by profi ts being greater than or 
equal to its interest payments (interest coverage ratio greater 
than or equal to 1), then for a given level of interest rate and 
accumulated stock of debt, the solvency condition will only be 
satisfi ed if profi ts do not fall below the given level of interest 
payments. But, at any given profi t share, profi ts would be 
determined by the level of output, which, in turn, are deter-
mined by the exogenous components of demand. In case the 
autonomous components of demand are weak, such that prof-
its fall below interest payments, then fi rms become insolvent. 
Such insolvency can itself be associated with a fall in private 
investments and aggregate output and can further trigger a 
sequence of negative shocks across the economy. 
Second, even if the economy starts off from a profi t rate which 
satisfi es the solvency condition, adverse shocks in expectations 
or autonomous components of demand may bring about an 
exogenous fall in the investments and profi ts rate. And, even if 
profi ts settle to a level that initially satisfi es the solvency condition, 
the economy can eventually start acting as a “ball lying on a grassy 
slope” (Harrod 1973: 32), where expectations of further decline 
in sales lead to a cumulative decline in investment, profi t rate, 
expectations, and so on, till the solvency condition is breached. 
In a nutshell, by its very nature, a spontaneous capitalist 
economy is typically susceptible to volatility and dynamic insta-
bility, and its growth rate, investments, and profi ts are affected 
by factors that are exogenous to its output. Thus, within the insti-
tutional framework of capitalism, the relevant question boils down 
to: How to stabilise such an unstable economy? Despite its limita-
tion within the existing institutional framework prevalent in a 
dual economy like India, one policy instrument that often played 
such a stabilising and stimulating role in the growth process 
during the dirigiste period was government expenditures. 
The introduction of new economic policies (NEP) in the Indian 
economy during the early 1990s, however, marked a sea change 
in the policy regime from what it was in the pre-liberalisation 
period. In sharp contrast to the dirigiste period of the decade of 
the 1980s or earlier, and except in a few odd instances, the period 
of economic liberalisation has been typically characterised by 
the reduced role of the public sector and government expendi-
tures in providing stimulus to India’s growth process. By making 
fi scal defi cit the function of output, the implementation of the 
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act in the early 
2000s endogenised an otherwise autonomous component of 
demand that was earlier used as a policy instrument. 
The institutional constraint in using government expendi-
tures as an effective policy instrument, as we shall argue, had 
at least two implications. First, the economy acquired external 
dependence to keep up the growth rate; the trend in profi ts 
and investments became largely dependent on exogenous ex-
ternal market conditions. Second, the very objective of stabi-
lising profi ts and investments in an otherwise unstable system 
eventually opened up the ground for a new policy regime in 
which fi nancial fragility was an intrinsic component. 
External Dependence since the 2000s
Despite the withdrawal of fi scal stimulus in the early 2000s, 
the Indian economy did not witness any major challenge in 
keeping up its profi ts during the entire decade as it witnessed a 
high output growth rate (Azad et al 2017). The booms of the 
2000s, however, were triggered primarily by factors that were 
exogenous to India’s domestic policymaking (Dasgupta 2020). 
The global economy was characterised by two booms during 
this period: one before the emergence of the global fi nancial 
crisis, and the other during the brief recovery period in the 
immediate aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis (2009–10 
and 2010–11) due to implementation of synchronised fi scal 
stimulus packages all across the world. In the midst of such a 
global upswing, India’s export growth rate registered a sharp 
increase and, consequently, brought about a sequence of 
expansion of aggregate demand through at least three routes. 
First, it provided stimulus to private investments as catering 
to a larger external market itself required incurring additional 
Figure 1: Share of Stressed (ICR<1) Firms in Private Non-financial Corporate 
Sector  (%)
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investment expenditures at a given capacity utilisation rate. 
Such a phenomenon was refl ected by the fact that while invest-
ments were driven by the registered manufacturing sector, as 
noted in Dasgupta (2020), such investments showed a positive 
and statistically signifi cant relationship with the lagged value of 
exports, after controlling for the changes in the capacity utilisation 
rate. Second, the consequent rise in aggregate demand involved 
further rise in housing demand and demand for construction-
related materials, which, in turn, provided further stimulus to 
private investments in a manner described by Ghosh and 
Chandrasekhar (2009) and Nagaraj (2013). Third, implemen-
tation of synchronised fi scal stimulus packages all across the 
world in the immediate aftermath of the global economic crisis 
not only boosted global demand and India’s exports, but also 
created room to increase India’s own fi scal defi cit during this 
brief period (Sen and Dasgupta 2014). With IMF providing the 
directive to cut back defi cits and the synchronised fi scal stimu-
lus packages being withdrawn across the world, India with-
drew its own fi scal stimulus and initiated a process of defi cit 
reduction which more or less continues uninterrupted till date. 
India’s growth process during this period has been charac-
teried by external dependence, such that the domestic economy 
primarily remained dependent on favourable, but exogenous 
external economic conditions for maintaining a high growth 
rate in domestic investment and output. Thus, as the global 
boom came to an end after 2010–11 following the withdrawal 
of synchronised fi scal stimulus packages across the world, the 
Indian economy started showing signs of slowdown (as we 
shall see later). This slowdown marked the beginning of the 
new policy regime during the 2010s.
Financial Fragility during the 2010s
The slowdown at the beginning of the last decade unleashed a 
process that involved a greater number of corporate fi rms 
becoming insolvent as their profi ts declined below their interest 
payment commitments, a phenomenon that was refl ected by the 
rise in the share of ICR<1 fi rms (Figure 1, p ??). In the absence 
of any signifi cant presence of the public sector in the real economy 
that could otherwise compensate for such adverse shocks, such 
insolvency of the non-fi nancial corporate sector opened up the 
possibility of further reduction in output and investments for the 
economy as a whole. But, any government that aims at keeping 
such fi rms afl oat despite their insolvency, either to maintain 
private investments and output at the given level or otherwise, 
would confront three distinct policy choices in such a situation: 
(i) reduce the gap between interest payment payments and 
profi ts, (ii) allow fi rms to operate despite loan default, or 
(iii) facilitate ponzi-fi nancing where borrowings are increased in 
order to pay off the gap between interest payments and profi ts. 
In the wake of a self-imposed institutional constraint of reduc-
ing defi cit target, increasing demand and private profi t through 
fi scal expansion remained outside the scope of the government 
policy. With the monetary transmission mechanism being broken 
(Anand and Azad 2019; Subramanian and Felman 2019) and 
monetary policy being exclusively aimed at infl ation targeting 
(Sen and Dasgupta 2014), reducing the effective interest rate 
of the corporate sector through repo rate operations also became 
untenable. Despite the prevalence of signifi cant amount of cor-
porate tax concessions, which possibly would have relaxed the 
solvency condition compared to its earlier level, the adverse 
impact of output slowdown dominated, as refl ected by the rise 
in the share of stressed fi rms during this period. 
This prevalence of institutional and structural constraint to 
boost demand, along with the need to keep insolvent corporate 
fi rms afl oat, played a central role in pushing the Indian economy 
at the beginning of this decade to a qualitatively new policy regime 
that was primarily associated with three distinct mechanisms: 
(i) allowing loan default, (ii) reducing corporate debt stock through 
debt-write-offs by public sector banks, and (iii) facilitating Ponzi 
fi nancing. These mechanisms together implied, as pointed out by 
Rajan (2014), that the “bank’s debt becomes junior debt and the 
promoter’s equity becomes super equity. The promoter enjoys 
riskless capitalism.”2 How does this new policy regime operate? 
First mechanism: The fi rst mechanism involves tolerating loan 
defaults of the non-fi nancial corporate sector without penalis-
ing the defaulters to any signifi cant extent. Since, by hypothesis, 
the default of loan payments or non performing assets (NPAs) 
indicates that fi rms are not making interest payments at the 
given level of debt, by implication, it is a de facto reduction in the 
effective interest rate of fi rms. The mirror image of such loan 
defaults of the non-fi nancial sector is the burgeoning NPAs of 
the fi nancial sector along with the reduction in their net profi ts.
Such deterioration of the balance sheet of the fi nancial sector 
is refl ected in Figure 2 by a sharp rise in the share of NPAs in gross 
advances of scheduled commercial banks and non-banking fi nan-
cial companies (NBFCs) during 2011–19. While the public sector 
banks registered such a rise right from 2011, what was noteworthy 
in the recent period from 2016 onwards was the sharp rise in NPAs 
of the NBFCs. By March 2019, while the NPA ratio of the public 
sector banks and all scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) stood 
at 9.3% and 12.6%, respectively, that of the NBFCs stood at 6.6%.
Second mechanism: The second mechanism involving debt 
write-offs opens up the possibility of reducing interest payment 
commitments of the non-fi nancial sector at any given effective 
interest rate.3 While the banks’ NPAs increased signifi cantly during 
the last decade, the debt write-offs of NPAs increased at a far greater 
Figure 2: Share of NPAs in Gross Advance (%)
Source: Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, RBI; Financial Stability Repost, RBI, 
various years.
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pace during this period. Figure 3 shows the ratios between NPA 
write-offs and gross NPAs for both public sector banks and all 
SCBs, both of which increased phenomenally in the last decade. 
Third mechanism: In the midst of higher credit demand of 
the non-fi nancial corporate sector to maintain its own viability, 
the credit supply was allowed to increase through an increase 
in the risk-appetite (reduction in the risk premium) of the 
fi nancial sector. If the credit supply of the fi nancial sector is 
perceived to be a negative function of its risk premium, where-
as the risk premium is affected, inter alia, by the intensity of 
the fi nancial stress of the borrower, then the new policy frame-
work facilitated a de facto reduction in risk premium, where 
the fi nancial sector was willing to provide additional credit to 
the fi nancially stressed fi rms (Azad et al 2017). 
The above phenomenon is refl ected in Figure 4, which shows 
the share of fi nancially stressed fi rms in outstanding corporate 
debt and bank credit, where the fi nancially stressed fi rms are 
defi ned as those fi rms whose interest coverage ratio is less than 1. 
As evident from Figure 4, while the share of stressed fi rms in 
outstanding debt and credit either declined or remained stable 
during the 2000s, it marked a sharp rise in the last decade 
since 2010–11. Such a phenomenon of increase in debt of stressed 
fi rms was associated with a rise in the overall debt–capital ratio 
of the corporate sector during the fi rst half of the last decade 
(Figure 4). In sharp contrast to the 2000s, when higher debt 
ratio was driven by non-stressed fi rms, as indicated by the 
declining share of stressed fi rms in debt during this period, 
the rise in the debt–capital ratio during the fi rst half of the 
2010s was driven by the higher debt of stressed fi rms. This was 
also the period when the share of stressed fi rms increased in 
annual credit fl ow (Azad et al 2017). While the debt–capital 
ratio declined during the present episode of slowdown, such a 
decline was hardly driven by the stressed fi rms as their share 
in debt and bank borrowings continued to rise. 
Such an experience of prolonged rise in the share of stressed 
fi rms in debt (encompassing almost a decade), along with the 
consistent rise in the share of stressed fi rms in total fi rms, cannot 
be explained simply as a cyclical phenomenon. Rather, the 
phenomenon of fi nancial fragility can be attributed to a policy 
regime which tolerates greater balance sheet stress and loan 
default of the non-fi nancial sector by transferring the risk from 
the debtors to the creditors. In the absence of any effective policy 
instrument which can boost demand, credit supply becomes a 
policy lever to keep fi rms afl oat despite being insolvent or retain 
private investments by increasing leverage ratios.4 Instead of any 
anomaly, here, fi nancial fragility becomes a logical necessity. 
There were two implications of this fi nancial fragility. First, 
despite debt write-offs, interest payments of the corporate sector 
increased on account of higher accumulated debt by the fi rst 
half of this decade as compared to the 2000s. Since the solvency 
condition would be refl ected by the difference between profi ts 
and interest payments, by implication, the minimum level of 
profi t that would be required to maintain this solvency condi-
tion also increased. Second, the fi nancial sector registered a 
decline in profi ts and far greater stress on their balance sheet 
during this period as compared to the 2000s. It is against the 
backdrop of this inherited fi nancial fragility, along with the 
structural and institutional constraints in implementing 
demand boosting policies, that the emergence of the present 
slowdown is analysed in the next section. 
The Immediate Causes of Slowdown
The slowdown of 2011–12 and 2012–13, as evident from Figure 5, 
was interrupted by a brief recovery period between 2013–14 and 
2016–17. Such a recovery, similar to the growth trajectory of the 
2000s, was triggered by favourable external market conditions 
that were exogenous to India’s policymaking as international 
crude oil prices registered a sharp decline during this period. 
However, the period of brief recovery was soon followed by 
the present episode of slowdown since 2017–18. What explains 
the present episode of slowdown? There are at least three 
immediate factors that can be attributed to this phenomenon.
Source: Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, RBI.
Figure 5: Annual GDP Growth Rate  (%)
Source: Linked GDP series, NSC and National Accounts Statistics, CSO.
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Figure 4: Debt–Capital Ratio and Share of ICR<1 Firms in Outstanding Debt 
and Bank Credit (%)
Debt–capital ratio of a given period is calculated as a ratio between stock of debt and net fixed assets 
of the previous period. It is measured in the secondary axis. Sample comprises of 1,198 firms.
Source: Prowess Database, CMIE
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First, after an initial decline between 2013–14 and 2016–17, 
which otherwise played a key role in triggering the brief 
recovery, the import–GDP ratio started rising once again from 
2017–18 onwards (Figure 6). Such a rise in the import–GDP ratio 
was driven by a sharp rise in oil imports and higher inter-
national crude oil prices, as refl ected in Figure 6 by a similar 
rise in the share of oil in total imports during this period. 
While the brief decline in crude oil prices and the import–GDP 
ratio between 2013–14 and 2016–17 acted as a countervailing 
force in reviving India’s output growth rate despite weak global 
demand, the recovery of crude oil prices in the recent period 
has reversed this trend. The rise in import ratio, along with 
weak global demand, pushed the Indian economy into the 
present phase of slowdown in 2017–18.
Second, while a buoyant export market during the 2000s 
had provided stimulus to private investments, the subsequent 
global slowdown was associated with a lower investment–capital 
ratio as it adversely affected aggregate demand and expectations 
of future profi tability.5 The close relationship between the 
investment–capital ratio and export–capital ratio is depicted 
in Figure 7. The levels of both the investment–capital ratio 
and export–capital ratio remained far lower in 2018–19 as 
compared to 2011–12. Despite the rise in oil prices, the export 
market remained subdued. In fact, India’s export growth rate 
has registered a further decline since March 2019 when it 
registered a growth rate of 12.2%, as the nominal monthly 
merchandise export growth rate turned to be negative since 
June 2019 (-7.8%) and stood at -1.1% in October 2019. 
Despite the rise in oil prices, the export market remained 
subdued for the entire decade. Further, the world output 
growth rate declined since 2017 for three consecutive years and 
has been associated with increasing instances of protectionist 
and retaliation measures by the United States (US) and its trading 
partners (IMF 2019). These recent developments have been re-
fl ected by the sharp decline in the growth rate of the volume of 
world trade and industrial production, particularly from Janu-
ary 2018 onwards (Figure 8). Refl ecting the trend of global de-
mand, India’s export growth rate registered a sharp decline. 
Such a fall in demand would adversely affect expectations 
regarding future sales and profi tability and, hence, would 
push the producers to cut back investments leading to further 
reduction in demand and so on. The fact that the Indian economy 
went through such a process in the last one year is evident 
from Figure 9, which shows the trend in business assessment 
and expectations of selected manufacturing companies from 
RBI’s Industrial Outlook Survey.
The survey assesses the business sentiment for the current 
quarter and expectations for the ensuing quarter, based on 
qualitative responses on a set of indicators refl ecting the 
perceptions of responding companies on various functional 
aspects. Figure 9 depicts the trend in three indicators: Business 
Assessment Index (BAI), Business Expectation Index (BEI), and 
the share of fi rms which expect a reduction in capacity utilisa-
tion rate for the relevant period. The fall in BEI since 2018–19 
Q4 and that of BAI since 2019–20 Q1 indicates a deterioration of 
business expectations and assessment. Such a deterioration of 
Figure 6: Crude Oil Price (Indian basket, $/bbl), Import–GDP Ratio (%) and 
Share of Oil in Import (%) 
Crude oil price is measured in the right axis.
Source: National Account Statistics, CSO; Database of Indian Economy, RBI and Petroleum, 
Planning and Analysis Cell, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, GoI.
 Share of oil in total import (%)
 Crude oil price (Indian Basket, $/bbl)
 Import-GDP ratio
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Figure 8: Monthly Growth Rate of World Trade Volume and World Index of 
Industrial Production (IIP)
Source: World Economic Outlook, October 2019.
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Figure 9: Business Expectations and Assessments of Manufacturing Sector
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Figure 7: Investment–Capital Ratio and Export–Capital Ratio, 2000–01 to 
2018–19
Source: National Accounts Statistics, CSO, various years.
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business expectations and assessment was associated with a 
sharp increase in number of fi rms that expected a fall in their 
capacity utilisation rate for the ensuing quarter.
The third factor pertained to the interaction between de-
mand slowdown and fi nancial fragility of the economy, which 
the latter inherited since the turn of the present decade. What 
was specifi c about the present phase of slowdown was 
the high debt-repayment commitment that the corporate sec-
tor inherited through its accumulated debt stock since 2011–
12. At the high level of interest payments that fi rms inherited, 
decline in profi t rate in the latter half of the last decade due to 
lower demand brought about a sharp rise in the share of 
stressed fi rms in the corporate sector as profi ts fell below 
their interest payments (Figure 1). 
The consequent repayment crisis of the non-fi nancial corpo-
rate sector adversely affected the interest income and profi tabil-
ity of the creditors, constituting the banks and the NBFCs. 
Though loan defaults and debt write-offs have otherwise 
been a central feature for the public sector banks in the past, 
what was specifi c during this episode of loan default was the 
exposure of the NBFCs to the corporate sector. By March 2018, 
the NBFCs had emerged as one of the important sources of credit 
supply for the corporate sector, with loan disbursement of more 
than 11.5% of the GDP.6 In sharp contrast to the commercial 
banks where deposits constitute the bulk of the liabilities, most 
of the NBFCs are non-deposit-taking and the largest components 
of their liabilities are the debt instruments. In other words, they 
lent long and borrowed short. The dwindling profi tability of the 
NBFC sector with respect to their high level of debt repayment 
commitments pushed many NBFCs to default. The fi rst big fi rm 
to have been labelled with the “default” status by credit rating 
agencies was the IL&FS in September 2018, followed by Reliance 
Home Finance and Reliance Commercial Finance in April 2019, 
DHFL in June 2019, and Altico Capital in September 2019. 
The collapse of the IL&FS initiated a severe contagion effect 
as lenders increasingly reduced their exposure to the NBFC 
sector in the midst of greater uncertainty and fi nancial fragility. 
As is evident from Table 2, the growth rate of total liabilities 
for the NBFCs sharply declined between March 2018 and 
September 2019. As is evident from the decline in their shares in 
total liabilities during this period, the decline in the liabilities 
growth rate was primarily driven by a sharp fall in debentures 
and commercial papers (Table 2, Item 3a). The squeeze in the 
NBFCs’ balance sheet from the liability side led to a sharp fall in 
the asset side through a reduction in the growth rate of dis-
bursed loans and advances. By September 2019, the growth rate 
of loans and advances by NBFCs reduced to 9.9% as compared 
to 31.8% in March 2018.
The sharp fall in loans and advances of the NBFCs had an 
immediate impact on the output of those sectors that were 
primarily dependent on NBFC credit. Figure 10 shows the 
sectoral composition of NBFC credit disbursement by Septem-
ber 2018. The industrial sector with 52% credit share was the 
largest recipient of NBFC credit, followed by retail loans (22.1%) 
and commercial real estate (6.7%). Within retail loans, the 
single biggest component was the vehicle loans with a credit 
share of 9.8%. The credit squeeze that engulfed the entire NBFC 
sector had an immediate adverse impact on the industrial sector 
at least through three distinct routes: (i) a reduction in indus-
trial credit, (ii) fall in automobile demand through a squeeze 
in vehicle loans, and (iii) reduction in demand of infra-
construction-related goods through sudden squeeze in credit 
disbursement to the real estate sector. 
The trend in the growth rate of index of industrial production 
(IIP) is shown in Figure 11. The industrial growth rate registered 
Table 2: Selected Balance Sheet Items of NBFCs
   March  March September 
  2018 2019 2019
Growth rates (%)
 Total liabilities 26.8 17.9 13.2
 Loans and advances disbursed by NBFCs 31.8 16 9.9
Share in total liabilities (%)
1 Share of reserves and share capital 23.3 22.6 23.7
2 Share of deposits and other liabilities 7.5 9 9.1
3 Share of borrowing 69.2 68.5 67.2
 3a Share of debentures and commercial papers 39.6 34.4 32.3
 3b Share of other borrowings 29.6 34.1 34.9
The above balance sheet of NBFCs provides the aggregate figures for deposit taking 
(NBFC-D) and systematically important non-deposit taking (NBFC-ND-SI) companies. 
Growth rate is calculated on y-o-y basis. 
Source: Calculated from Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, RBI.
Figure 10: Sectoral Composition of NBFC Loans and Advances 
in September 2018  (%)
The aggregate figures for deposit taking (NBFC-D) and systematically important non-deposit 
taking (NBFC-ND-SI) companies are provided. The housing loan, consumer loan, vehicle 
loan and “other retail loans” together constitute the aggregate retail loans.
Source: Calculated from Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, RBI.
4c Vehicle loans
4d Other retail loans
4b Consumer loan
4a Housing loan
3c Other services
3b Retail trade
3a Commercial real estate
2 Industry
1 Agriculture and 
allied
5 Others
Figure 11: Monthly Growth Rate of Index of Industrial Production  (%)
DHFL
default 
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Source: Database of Indian Economy, RBI.
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
A
pr
il 
20
16
Ju
ne
 2
01
6
A
ug
us
t 2
01
76
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
6
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
6
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
01
8
A
pr
il 
20
17
Ju
ne
 2
01
7
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
7
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
01
8
A
pr
il 
20
18
Ju
ne
 2
01
8
A
ug
us
t 2
01
8
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
8
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
8
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
01
9
A
pr
il 
20
19
Ju
ne
 2
01
9
A
ug
us
t 2
01
9
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
89
IL&FS 
default 
status
MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCE
MARCH 28, 2020 vol lV no 13 EPW  Economic & Political Weekly52
a sharp decline particularly in two phases: (i) during Novem-
ber 2018, and (ii) since August 2019. The decline during the 
fi rst phase was in the immediate aftermath of the IL&FL crisis 
where the credit squeeze would have an immediate impact. 
The second phase of sharp decline came about in the midst of 
weak global demand, when the collapse of DHFL acted as an 
additional negative shock to output growth rate. With negative 
export growth rate and credit shocks, the IIP growth rate has 
continued to be negative in three consecutive months from 
August to October 2019. 
In a nutshell, the present episode of slowdown was triggered 
both by demand-side factors and the existing fi nancial fragility 
of the economy, with each feeding on the other. What can 
be the policy-level response in the midst of such an unprece-
dented slowdown?
Immediate Binding Constraint and Policy Objective
The precise nature of policy measure, inter alia, would be 
dependent on the diagnosis of what constitutes the immediate 
binding constraint on output. Given the specifi city of the pre-
sent slowdown, where both the output growth rate and credit 
growth rate registered a sharp decline, there are two possible 
candidates that can act as the immediate binding constraint: 
(i) the fi nance constraint, or (ii) the demand constraint. In 
the case of the former, higher availability of credit at a given 
level of the borrower’s risk revives the output growth rate by 
relaxing fi nance constraint, whereas in the case of the latter, 
higher demand revives the output growth rate by relaxing 
demand constraint. 
The possibility of demand constraint emerges from the squeeze 
in the aggregate demand and the consequent fall in expected 
profi tability of investment projects and actual investments. The 
possibility of fi nance constraint emerges from the stressed balance 
sheet of the fi nancial sector, which may lead them to reduce credit 
supply at a given level of economic activity due to a squeeze in 
its lending capacity and, thereby, impose an immediate con-
straint on investment and output at a given profi t rate. Which 
of the above constraints is immediately binding on the economy 
is an empirical question that we now attempt to address. 
The possibility of a binding fi nance constraint from the 
creditor side would emerge if the fi nancial sector as a whole 
reduces its credit supply due to a squeeze in its lending capacity 
at a given level of economic activity. Precisely because a 
credit squeeze from one sub-sector can be mitigated by higher 
credit supply from another sub-sector; the necessary condi-
tion for such a fi nance constraint to operate is that the credit 
supply of the entire fi nancial sector should be constrained by 
its lending capacity. In the midst of a squeeze in the NBFC 
credit, the question which therefore needs to be addressed is 
whether the banking sector is also constrained by a squeeze 
in its lending capacity. 
The lending capacity of a bank, or the maximum amount of 
loans that the banks can potentially disburse (say L*), can be 
defi ned as the difference between their total fi nancial assets (A) 
and that part of the liquid assets which the banks are statutorily 
required to hold in the form of reserves and securities (S). The 
fi nancial assets are calculated by deducting fi xed assets and 
“other assets” from total assets, and include fi nancial invest-
ments, cash balances, and loans and advances. The statutory 
part of the liquid asset (S) is determined, inter alia, through 
the cash reserve ratio (CRR), statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), 
and, after January 2015, through the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) as per Basel III norms. Any rise in the NPAs, as the banks 
have witnessed in the recent past, can adversely affect their 
lending capacity in two ways: (i) the banks can reduce the size 
of their balance sheet and assets (A) to maintain a given level 
of capital adequacy ratio, and (ii) the external cost of borrow-
ing of banks can rise as their balance sheet deteriorates, 
which, in turn, may lead the banks to hold the higher statutory 
part of the liquid asset (S) in order to maintain a given liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR).7 
While the lending capacity (L*) provides the upper bound or 
the maximum amount of loan that banks can potentially disburse, 
the actual loans (say, L) is determined by effective demand of 
the economy and, hence, can be less than or equal to the lending 
capacity. In order to demarcate the demand-side effect on actual 
loans from the supply-side effect on lending capacity, we 
construct a ratio between actual loans and lending capacity. 
For the sake of convenience, this ratio is termed as the loan 
disbursement rate (LDR, henceforth). Any fall in LDR would 
indicate lower credit demand for a given lending capacity, 
whereas any rise in this rate would indicate the opposite. 
By defi nition, LDR is less than or equal to 1. We construct two 
estimates of LDR. In the fi rst estimate, the statutory part of 
the liquid asset (S) comprises the amount determined by CRR 
and SLR, whereas, in the second estimate, it comprises the 
amount determined by CRR, SLR, and the stipulated LCR.
After registering a sharp rise during the boom period of the 
2000s and maintaining a high level till 2014–15, the LDR 
witnessed a sharp fall particularly from 2015–16 onwards for 
both the estimates (Figure 12). Not only does the actual loan 
disbursement of commercial banks presently continue to be 
far lower than the lending capacity, as refl ected by its rela-
tively low value, but it also happens to be far lower than the 
peak value of 0.85 that it earlier attained during 2007–08. 
The fact that the banks are characterised by idle lending 
capacity and are holding liquid assets far higher than what is 
statutory, rather indicates a situation of a binding demand 
Figure 12: Loan Disbursement Rate (LDR) of Scheduled Commercial Banks
Estimates 1 and 2 only diverges from 2014–15 onwards with the implementation of 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio norms in India. 
Source: Database of Indian Economy, RBI.
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constraint in the credit market. This conclusion is similar to 
that of Anand and Azad (2019). 
There are primarily three reasons for the fall in LDR in the 
recent years. First, it can be attributed to the change in the 
demand pattern of the borrowers in favour of the NBFCs and 
away from commercial banks during the latter half of the 
2010s. One plausible reason for the latter phenomenon can be 
greater risk exposure of the NBFCs during this period, because 
of which their effective interest rate, net of risk premium, 
would be lower as compared to the commercial banks. Sec-
ond, the fall in LDR during the last two years refl ects the over-
all demand squeeze in the aggregate economy following the 
fall in export demand and rise in import propensity. Third, 
due to massive liquidity infusion by the government in the 
recent period, the fall in the lending capacity has been less 
than proportionate to the fall in aggregate demand.
Therefore, for any policy response to be effective, it needs to 
be aimed at relaxing the demand constraint and stabilising 
the unstable economy. Notwithstanding the scepticism around 
“crowding out”—a proposition that otherwise remains rather 
unfounded either theoretically or empirically (Anand and 
Azad 2019) —one suffi cient condition to do that is to bring 
back government expenditures at the centre of India’s growth 
process to be used as a policy instrument for boosting demand. 
Concluding Remarks
What remains at the heart of the present slowdown is a growth 
regime where fi nancial fragility is an intrinsic component and 
one which is largely dependent on favourable external market 
conditions for its recovery and boom. Both these features 
follow from the lack of any effective policy instrument of 
boosting aggregate demand. The government expenditures, 
which once played this stimulating role, have now been with-
drawn without being replaced by any alternative effective 
policy instrument. 
Rather, the broad strategy of the existing policy regime is to 
try relaxing the solvency condition through corporate tax cuts, 
tolerating greater fi nancial fragility through greater liquidity 
infusion or maintaining a lax resolution mechanism for loan 
defaults and, in the meanwhile, “wait out the storm” till the 
global economy recovers or oil prices start falling. In the midst 
of a binding demand constraint, there are at least three prob-
lems with this strategy.
First, while such measures can play a role in resisting further 
decline in the output growth rate by stopping a spiralling of 
demand reduction, credit crunch, and balance sheet crisis, it 
can hardly have any impact of increasing output. Since invest-
ment decisions are affected by present output, whereas output 
remains constrained by demand, relaxing balance sheet con-
straints or fi nance constraints hardly increases investment or 
output. Second, in the midst of external dependence, when 
exactly would the recovery set in is exogenous to domestic 
policymaking and, hence, its timing is uncertain. And, in 
between this long haul, livelihoods get destroyed. Third, since 
the present strategy has de facto involved a deterioration of 
interest coverage ratio of fi rms during the downswing, while 
exhibiting a somewhat downward rigidity during the upswing, 
continuing with this strategy makes the economy more vul-
nerable to negative external shocks in the future. 
The Indian economy needs a change in its policy regime and 
growth trajectory, because what presently remains operational 
is a regime of fi nancial fragility and vulnerability.
Notes
1  Table 1 shows fi gures till 2019–20 Q2. Accord-
ing to the CSO’s latest press release, the GDP 
growth rate has fallen to 4.7% in Q3 as com-
pared to 5.1% in Q2.
2  This is not to argue that maintaining viability 
of fi rms has to be necessarily the only objective of 
such a regime; a fi rm which is otherwise solvent 
can still receive loans more than their “normal” 
line of credit and be a benefi ciary of debt-write 
offs through sheer cronyism. However, in the 
context of the topic at hand, our emphasis re-
mains on the former and not the latter. 
3  The reduction in interest payment commit-
ment here does not necessarily imply reduction 
in actual expenditure on interest payments 
during the given period, since fi rms may not be 
making such payments to start with (which is 
why the asset was categorised as an NPA in the 
fi rst place); rather, it absolves fi rms from the 
commitment of making interest payments even 
in the future. 
4  It can be noted, that private investments can 
not only fall when fi rms go out of business, but 
decline even when they remain afl oat once 
fi rms start deleveraging to repair their balance 
sheet. Koo (2011) has adopted the latter route 
to explain Japan’s slowdown in the post-1990s 
period through what he termed as the balance 
sheet crisis. 
5  See Dasgupta (2020) for a detailed analysis. 
6  The loan disbursement data is only for deposit 
taking (NBFC-D) and systematically important 
non-deposit taking (NBFC-ND-SI) companies. 
fi gure for March 2018 is derived by defl ating 
outstanding loans of these NBFCs by the GDP 
for 2017–18.
7  The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is the ratio 
between high quality liquid asset (HQLA) and 
expected net cash outfl ow. Any rise in expected 
net cash outfl ow, say due to actual rise in exter-
nal cost of borrowing, can lead the banks to 
hold higher HQLA in order to maintain a given 
LCR. This may increase the statutory part of 
the liquid assets (S) held by banks. 
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